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Abstract  
 
This article examines the relationship between community policing, intelligence-led 
policing and crime control. Whilst community and intelligence-led policing have 
developed as distinctive reform movements within contemporary UK policing there 
have been calls for the two to interact in practice. In particularly, aspects of 
community policing are operationalized through the frameworks of intelligence-led 
policing.  This article unpicks the structures and processes of (community) 
intelligence processes in detail. It focuses on the nature of information generated from 
community policing; how analytical products are constructed; and the nature of the 
officer tasking and briefing process. It is argued that community policing was 
conceived, at least in part, as an alternative to traditional reactive policing styles 
which coalesce around patrol, rapid response to incidents and enforcement of the 
criminal law. However, as community policing has evolved in practice it has become 
firmly embedded in conventional police-centric notions of ‘efficiency’, law 
enforcement and crime control. 
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Introduction  
 
Since the turn of the century two policing styles have come to prominence in UK 
police practice: community policing and intelligence-led policing. Certain attempts 
have been made to see that they interact in practice. This article starts by introducing 
community and intelligence-led policing and sets out how, in principle, the two 
approaches should interrelate in contemporary UK police practice. It then sets out the 
results of an empirical study which examined this interaction focusing on the 
structures and processes of (community) intelligence systems. Implications for the 
relationship between community policing and crime control are set out in the 
conclusion.  
 
Community and intelligence-led policing  
 
Community policing has been an important reform movement in policing in the UK 
and around the world. For some decades it has stood for a mechanism to legitimise the 
relationship between the police and communities. Originating as a means of 
improving police/minority-ethnic community relations, contemporary manifestations 
of community policing have extended this remit to police/community relations more 
broadly (Fielding, 2005). Community policing represents a break from bureaucratic 
styles of policing which stress crime control, limited public interaction, random 
(motorised) patrol, shift work, coordinated central dispatch and territorial organisation 
of responsibility (Manning, 1997 [1977]: 11). Instead, community policing has sought 
to broaden the police mandate from a narrow crime fighting one to one that addresses 
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wider issues – such as fear of crime, social and physical disorder and neighbourhood 
problems – and to provide a means through which police officers work can with 
residents to identify and solve problems which are priorities for them (Trojanowicz et 
al, 1998). The practice of community policing has evolved over time and has varied 
across both time and place. It has involved the assignment of officers to specific 
geographical areas for extended periods of time in order to build up relationships with 
residents; the establishment of systems through which the police can consult with 
communities to understand their priorities and preferences for policing; and attempts 
to encourage the community to take greater responsibility for crime control (e.g. the 
establishment of neighbourhood watch) (Fielding, 2005).  
 
Over the last ten years a variant of community policing, termed ‘neighbourhood 
policing’, has been developing in the UK. Reflecting the discourse of community 
policing, neighbourhood policing seeks to orient policing services around the themes 
of ‘visibility’, ‘accessibility’ and ‘familiarity’ with a focus on problem-solving in co-
production with communities and partner agencies (Innes, 2005; Quinton and Morris, 
2008). Organised around highly localised geographical areas, usually wards, 
neighbourhood officers have been expected to spend significant amounts of time 
conducting activities –  especially patrol – to promote visibility. Residents should be 
able to access named police officers and as such neighbourhood teams have been 
expected to publicize their contact details along with the times and locations of 
community engagement events (see Casey, 2008 and Bullock, 2010). A feature of 
neighbourhood policing is the establishment of public meetings,
i
 organised by 
neighbourhood officers, which offer an opportunity for residents to express their 
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preferences for policing priorities and, in principle at least, to work together with the 
police service (and other agencies) to tackle those problems.  
 
Intelligence-led policing shares with community policing a desire to reform police 
practice. However, police reform is conceived in terms of improving the efficiency of 
existing processes and practice rather than wholesale reform of the police vision. 
Wood and Shearing (2007: 55) put it like this: ‘[intelligence-led policing] does not re-
imagine the police role so much as it re-imagines how the police can be smarter in the 
application of their unique authority and capacities’. Pinning down the contours of 
intelligence-led policing is not straightforward. However, the generation and use of 
crime analysis and criminal intelligence to identify and orient police resources 
towards tackling the most serious and prolific offenders/criminality has all been 
stressed:  
 
Intelligence-led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy where 
data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-
making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and 
prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement 
strategies that target prolific and serious offenders (Ratcliffe, 2008: 6).  
 
Of course, there is much devil in the detail and I will unpick aspects of this definition 
in the course of this article. Again reflecting community policing, intelligence-led 
policing is an evolving concept (Ratcliffe, 2008). At the time of writing, the National 
Intelligence Model (NIM) is the dominant apparatus through which intelligence-led 
policing operates in the UK. While the National Intelligence Model is ‘entwined with 
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intelligence-led policing’ (Ratcliffe, 2008: 107) it should be stressed that it is ‘not 
synonymous with the notion of intelligence-led policing’ (Ratcliffe, 2009: 178). The 
National Intelligence Model instead provides a framework through which 
intelligence-led policing can operate (Ratcliffe, 2009). It is an information-led 
deployment system which requires that the police service develop and use analytic 
products to coordinate the allocation of police – and potentially partner agency – 
resources. Thus official guidance stresses that the aim is to: ‘Ensure that policing is 
delivered in a targeted manner through the development of information and 
intelligence. It is used to prioritise issues and allocate resources to deal with them’ 
(ACPO Centrex, 2007: 6). The National Intelligence Model operates at different 
organisational levels of the police service. Level one operates at the basic command 
unit or small force, level two at the force or region and level three at the national or 
international level. Analytical products feed management groups which operate at 
these different levels making decisions about how and where to allocate resources. 
The whole process is ‘governed’ by codes of practice and minimum standards to 
which police services should, in principle at least, adhere (see ACPO/NCPE, 2005; 
ACPO/Centrex 2007).  
 
The interaction of community and intelligence-led policing 
 
There are certainly conceptual differences between the two policing styles. We have 
already seen that the two approaches have different rationales: community policing 
stressing legitimacy and a rejection of reactive methods and intelligence-led policing 
the more efficient deployment of police resources. Ratcliffe (2008:72-73) and Tilley 
(2003: 325-6) both further describe how the orientation, assumed benefits, criteria for 
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success, means through which outcomes should be achieved and the implications for 
the police organisation all might also differ. Community policing should be organised 
around identifying and tackling concerns identified by residents; seeks to improve 
confidence and satisfaction with policing; stresses informal social control; and 
requires the development of mechanisms to engage the community in setting priorities 
for police practice and participating in crime prevention initiatives. In contrast, 
intelligence-led policing tends to focus on identifying and disrupting criminal groups 
and the most prolific offenders; stresses arrest and ultimately incapacitation of 
offenders; and requires the recruitment and training of analysts and the development 
of processes to generate and analyse information.  
 
Whilst conceptually these two approaches may seem worlds apart there are points of 
similarity and commentators have noted moves towards conceptual integration of 
contemporary manifestations of community and intelligence-led policing (McGarrell 
et al, 2007).  One view is that is that both approaches are dependent on two-way 
communication between the public and the police (McGarrell et al, 2007). 
Community policing may offer the promise of reconnecting the police to the public 
and in so doing improve the flow of information between citizens and the police 
service (Ratcliffe, 2008: 3). Indeed, where community policing is justified in terms of 
improving the flow of information between communities and the police there is an 
analytic connection to draw between community and intelligence-led policing 
(Fielding, 2005). Another view is that the ‘compatibility’ of the models depends on 
how broadly intelligence-led policing is conceived, as well as how the processes are 
developed and implemented in practice (Maguire and John, 2006). Certainly, in the 
UK intelligence-led policing has evolved into a business model with potentially much 
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wider scope than its origins in criminal investigation and specialist police operations 
(John and Maguire, 2003) and with a focus on interagency problem-solving (Ratcliffe, 
2008) (and see McGarrell et al 2007).  
 
Indeed, as community and intelligence-led policing have developed in the UK overlap 
and interaction between the two are clear. As we have seen, neighbourhood policing 
has been the dominant version of community policing. Through focusing on high 
visibility patrol and addressing community concerns neighbourhood policing seeks to 
improve confidence in policing and offer reassurance to the public. However, there 
has also been an expectation that there will be a relationship between the National 
Intelligence Model and neighbourhood policing practice. So, the guiding principle is 
that the National Intelligence Model should drive neighbourhood policing deployment 
and resources: ‘Neighbourhood policing should be driven by information that has 
been rigorously analysed, and by the disciplines of multi-agency tasking and co-
ordination at appropriate levels’ (ACPO/NCPE, 2006: 14). However, neighbourhood 
policing should in turn drive the National Intelligence Model. Neighbourhood 
policing should act to generate information and that information should be 
incorporated into and help fuel the National Intelligence Model process. Guidance has 
drawn attention to how information may be generated from communities in different 
ways. This may include the observations of members of the public; information 
obtained by officers in the course of their duties within neighbourhoods; and 
information derived from other public sector workers such as teachers and doctors 
(ACPO/Centrex, 2007). Doing so has been assumed to increase knowledge of risk and 
vulnerability; improve opportunities for community engagement; and increase 
community confidence (ACPO/NCPE, 2006: 26). Additionally, as we have seen, one 
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aim of neighbourhood policing has been to proactively identify and tackle crime 
problems which are priorities for local communities. Police officers should view these 
priorities as ‘intelligence’ and incorporate them into National Intelligence Model 
systems: ‘Intelligence assessments will identify public concerns as intelligence issues 
so that they can be assessed and profiled, providing a basis for strategic and tactical 
decision making (ACPO/NCPE, 2006: 14). 
 
At the level of discourse then, there is a symbiotic relationship between 
neighbourhood policing and the National Intelligence Model. Information generated 
from communities should fuel the National Intelligence Model and in turn the 
National Intelligence Model should drive neighbourhood policing deployment of 
resources. Of course, this represents an ‘ideal’. Less is known about how 
neighbourhood policing and the National Intelligence Model align in practice and 
what impact local priorities determined through neighbourhood policing will have on 
the operation of the National Intelligence Model (Maguire and John, 2006). This 
article makes initial attempts to fill this empirical gap.  
 
This article  
 
The themes pursued in the remainder of this article are based on the accounts of some 
25 interviewees based in one local intelligence unit situated within a county police 
service in England
ii
. They comprised a range of roles including sworn and unsworn 
neighbourhood policing officers, field intelligence officers and analysts. The 
neighbourhood police officers (N= 10) generally had many years of experience 
working both as neighbourhood officers and in the police service more widely. They 
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were then in a good position to reflect on how neighbourhood policing has been 
developed and delivered in practice as well as how the framework fits into the 
policing environment more broadly. Neighbourhood teams are plural teams. Civilian 
Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) are heavily used throughout 
neighbourhood policing. Accordingly, some ten PCSOs were also interviewed. The 
PCSOs appeared to have slightly different experiences than the sworn officers. 
Although there was some variation, overall the PCSOs were less experienced than the 
sworn officers and their awareness of the broader processes of the policing 
environment limited. However, PCSOs had a great deal of knowledge of and 
experience of working with their communities. The remainder of the participants 
comprised a mixture of field intelligence officers and intelligence analysts working at 
both the local and force level.  
 
This force allocates in the order £3.5million – out of a police service budget of some 
£220m – to the ‘intelligence function’. This level of investment – about 1.5% – is 
reportedly in keeping with the national average. Of course distinguishing between 
those officers and civilian staff who comprise part of the intelligence structure and 
those who do not is difficult since, as will be explored in more detail shortly, very 
many warranted officers and police staff contribute through either submitting 
information and/or using it to shape their decision making and activities. However, at 
the time of writing some 230 officers and civilian staff were directly employed in 
‘intelligence activities’ based either at the force level or in one of three local 
intelligence units. Each local intelligence unit comprises a team of intelligence 
professionals incorporating a senior analyst, intelligence analysts and researchers as 
well as field intelligence and briefing and tasking officers. These teams conduct 
 10 
activities from proactively generating information, processing information and 
conducting research and analysis.  
 
Drawing on the themes derived from the interview data, the remainder of this article 
is concerned with unpicking the structures and processes of contemporary intelligence 
practices. It considers how neighbourhood policing operates to generate information 
and the social and organisational processes which frame the construction of 
intelligence. As Innes et al (2005: 42) argue, understanding the processes through 
which the police service manufacture and use intelligence is ‘pivotal in terms of 
understanding both the theory and practice of contemporary policing strategies’. 
Having considered how (community) intelligence is constructed by officers this 
article moves on to explore how structures and processes of intelligence practice come 
to mould the operation of neighbourhood policing in particular kinds of ways.  
 
The process and structure of (community) intelligence systems  
 
Intelligence processes comprise cycles of officer tasking, data collection, collation, 
analysis, dissemination and feedback (Ratcliffe, 2003). Information about the policing 
environment circulates both formally and informally. Whilst, as Manning (1992: 363) 
notes, most information about the policing environment ‘is briefly stored, resides in 
the memories of officers dispersed in time and space, has no uniform format, and can 
therefore rarely be retrieved’ under certain conditions, the nature of which I will turn 
to shortly, certain information is formally entered by officers on to an intelligence 
system and formally processed. Indeed, the police service in which this research was 
conducted handles significant amounts of information submitted by officers. On 
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average some 4,500 intelligence reports a month are generated and processed by 
sworn officers and civilian staff. In the UK the so-called ‘5*5*5’ process is the 
national information/intelligence report through which the police service should seek 
to ‘record, evaluate and disseminate information’ (ACPO/Centrex 2007: 26). These 
records should be formally documented, include an assessment of the reliability of the 
source of the information, the nature of the information submitted, a ‘handing code’ 
(which informs the way that information should be disseminated) and may also 
include a more comprehensive risk assessment (ACPO, 2007). Some information will 
be acted upon immediately. The rest will be assessed, ‘sanitised’iii and potentially 
entered onto the intelligence system to be used together with other data sets (recorded 
crime, calls for service) by force and borough level analysts. In turn, the outputs of the 
analysis – a variety of analytical products – should be used to fuel the tasking process 
at the different levels of the national intelligence model (neighbourhood, borough, 
force and region). The following sections explore these processes in practice focusing 
on the mechanisms through which neighbourhood policing generates information; the 
characteristics of that information; the nature of analytic products; and how they are 
used to influence neighbourhood policing.  
 
Generating (community) information  
Communities have been viewed as ‘repositories of information’ (Tilley, 2008: 96) 
and, as we have seen, an underlying principle of neighbourhood policing has been to 
extract that information and to use it to interpret the policing environment, prioritise 
problems and direct police resources. Officers interviewed as part of this study saw 
the neighbourhood policing role as a wide ranging one. However, they certainly 
believed that through being available and visible to residents and through ‘gaining 
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people’s trust and confidence’ (PC/05) information, that might not be available 
through other mechanisms, could be generated:  
 
I think we're key players in the intelligence model, because we do get more 
contact with the community than the response team who turn up and they're 
either dealing with a victim who to all intents and purposes it's too late when 
they become the victim, or the offender who's not really going to tell us much. 
Where we're on a day-to-day almost social basis with these people they're 
more likely to tell us stuff and the stronger those links become, the more sort 
of juicy the [intelligence is] going to be, for want of a better word. (PC/06) 
 
Officers accounts demonstrated that a range of information – from reports of low 
level disorder and environmental problems, to expressions of residents’ worries, 
perceptions and fears, to more specific information about unusual behaviour, risks, 
crimes and criminals – is relayed to or observed by neighbourhood officers in the 
course of their day-to-day activities: ‘Stuff they wouldn’t automatically call the police 
and report they might come and tell us about’ (PC/01). Whilst officers reported that 
they routinely submit information for formal processing – ‘(it) never stops’ 
(PCSO/03) – it is quite clear that only certain observations are submitted. The 
neighbourhood policing milieu is interpreted by officers and information filtered 
before it is formally processed. Any information that is formally captured in police 
intelligence systems inevitably represents only a proportion of the information that 
could be used to interpret the policing landscape. Commentators have drawn attention 
to how the decisions that police officers make when submitting information ‘is the 
root source’ of information formally processed and so comes to shape command 
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decisions (Manning, 1992a: 328) and that the processes through which information is 
shared are implicit and embedded in the culture of police organizations (Seba and 
Rowley, 2010: 611). Indeed, participants in this study drew attention to how officer’s 
decisions to submit information are founded in an interaction between what police 
officers believe represents important police ‘knowledge,’ organisational features of 
the police service and the structure of the intelligence system itself. The following 
sections consider these factors, returning later to a consideration of the nature of 
information derived from neighbourhood policing and its limitations.  
 
Police ‘knowledge’ 
Accounts drew attention to two themes which shape how officers come to understand 
neighbourhoods and structure their decisions to submit information to the intelligence 
system. Firstly, reflecting Cope (2004), officers reported that they value knowledge 
that they believe will be useful for facilitating the enforcement of the criminal law, as 
this officer demonstrates: ‘Yeah, anything that was of a criminal or possibility of 
being useful in a criminal investigation, anything like suspicious vehicles, things like 
that, anything suspicious like that I would put that in’ (PC/08). Secondly, the notions 
of ‘common sense,’ ‘knowing your patch’ or ‘experience’ were strongly embedded in 
police officers accounts of how they come to understand neighbourhoods: 
 
Just by knowing your area, knowing the nominal that you’re speaking to, 
knowing the member of public that you’re speaking to, hearing, you know, 
you’ve got your ear to the ground in neighbourhoods, you hear things in 
neighbourhoods because people trust you as a police officer, which is good, 
that’s what you want (PC/3). 
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The importance that police officers attach to experience is well documented (see 
Bayley and Bittner, 1984). Manning and Hawkins (1989: 150) argued that for police 
officers valid knowledge is contextual, substantive and grounded in social life as 
experienced by officers on the streets and needs to be learnt over time: ‘reality is 
street reality.’ Similarly, Cope (2004: 199) argued that police officers work on the 
basis of ‘constructed experiential knowledge’ which frames how crime and offending 
comes to be understood. As we will soon explore, there are limits to police officer 
knowledge of their environment. However, this crime-centric lens, coupled with the 
importance placed on constructed, experiential knowledge within police practice, 
comes to filter assessments of information and ultimately shape the nature of the 
information incorporated in intelligence systems, as elaborated in the following 
sections.   
 
This outlook influences the nature of the problem types about which officers submit 
information. It follows that officers reported being more likely to routinely submit 
information related to crime problems than information related to other forms of 
police-relevant problems such as disorder, antisocial behaviour and traffic. It also 
determines the kinds of people who are represented on intelligence systems. 
Criminologists have long argued that the police tend to focus on the ‘usual suspects’ 
(Fielding, 1995a: 64). Indeed information submitted onto the systems reportedly 
centres on the routines and behaviour of offenders who are already known to the 
police (‘nominals’), as indicated in the quote from PC/3 above. The risk, to which 
Cope (2004: 199) draws attention, is ‘policing-led intelligence’ where information 
starts to converge on certain people who are routinely drawn into the system rather 
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than problems more broadly conceived. This perspective also has an effect on 
officer’s perceptions of the timeliness of information. The officers drew attention to 
how ‘real time’ information that can be acted on immediately was valued. As Fielding 
(1995a: 162) notes ‘The insistently practical focus of police interest in information 
prioritises short-term content with a direct pay off.’ Historical information, which may 
be useful for building up pictures of crime problems over time, is not viewed to be as 
valuable as information which allows officers to act immediately by officers: 
decisions ‘are in the here and now’ and ‘immediate’ (Manning and Hawkins, 1989: 
150). This perspective also comes, at least in part, to frame how officers make 
assessments of the reliability of the sources from which information is generated. 
When considering the reliability of sources of information officers often drew 
attention to the importance of experience and intuition: ‘I will have a hunch about 
whether it is true’ (PCSO/02). However, the crime-centric perspective is also evident 
in shaping assessment of reliability. Echoing Innes et al (2005), participants drew 
attention to how the observations of police officers and informants – both strongly 
embedded in a criminal environment – are viewed to generate reliable information 
about crime and offending. That said officers also valued information derived from 
other professionals such as housing officers, teachers, doctors and prison staff. Even 
so, there was a tendency for officers to prefer specific information about people 
already known to the police. For example, participants in this study drew attention to 
how information generated from HM Prison Service regarding when known offenders 
were to be released from prisons was especially useful. In contrast, information 
generated from residents was often viewed by officers to be less useful than that 
generated from the aforementioned sources. This perspective seems to be founded in 
officer’s perceptions that most residents – and especially those residents who 
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routinely engage with police officers through the neighbourhood policing apparatus –  
do not have access to the information that they perceive to be most valuable and, more 
broadly, that most residents are unlikely to be known to officers and so are not 
‘trusted’. These points are elaborated in later sections.  
 
Organisation and structure  
Organisational and structural aspects of the police service come to interact with police 
officer knowledge in shaping the nature of the information ultimately submitted to 
intelligence systems. Organisational and structural characteristics of the police service 
orient officers towards submitting certain kinds of information, underpinning and 
reinforcing the assessments described above. Particularly evident in officers’ accounts 
were the role of police service priorities and the configuration of the information 
processes, considered in the following sections.  
 
Police service priorities frame the nature of the information submitted to intelligence 
systems, to some extent at least. Officers drew attention how they are directed to 
orient the information they submit in terms of particular problems and people that 
mirror police priorities. These are most likely to comprise the more serious crime 
problems such as Class A drug dealing, burglary and vehicle crime. It should be 
stressed that there is some complexity here. Police service priorities are unlikely to be 
framed exclusively in terms of the more serious crime problems. Given the focus on 
reassurance policing together with the requirements to consult with communities that 
has been evident in England and Wales over recent years, priorities may well also 
include broader issues such as satisfaction with and confidence in the police service as 
well as forms of disorder and antisocial behaviour. Priorities also vary depending on 
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the organisational level of the police service. So, whilst at the force level efforts may 
well be concentrated on understanding and disrupting the activities of serious prolific 
offenders, at the local level the landscape may be very different. Accordingly, this 
analyst described how issues of antisocial behaviour and disorder may be drawn into 
the intelligence systems at the neighbourhood level: 
 
 I mean obviously a lot more emphasis these days on antisocial behaviour, 
graffiti, you know, dog muck and all of that kind of thing. We do get, if we get 
the intelligence in on that sometimes it’s set up as a neighbourhood issue by 
the neighbourhood team, we can record and link the intelligence to that. And 
then they target that specific issue. We can put out products to support. It 
doesn’t just have to be a crime. We do produce problem summaries, problem 
profiles on a particular area that’s experiencing lots of antisocial behaviour. Or 
if there’s a group of, recently we had it in the [named area], a group of 
offenders, young boys who were causing a massive issue for their 
neighbourhood. They hadn’t committed any crimes but they were just hanging 
out drinking and it was becoming a big issue for the neighbourhood so, the 
people living there, so we produced a document that showed the type of crime 
that they were involved in, gave it to the neighbourhood team who could then 
go out at certain times and interrupt their actual hanging around in the park 
and which parks it was, where the home addresses, all of that sort of fed in 
from our intelligence and are looking at all those incidents.  
 
That said, in practice officers may well submit information on people and problems 
wider than those officially prioritised by the police service. This is especially so 
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where officers are unclear about how the intelligence system should operate or where 
police priorities are shifting over time.  
 
The configuration of information technology – which provides the mechanism for 
collating, storing and managing information – is of importance in shaping decisions to 
submit information. Police intelligence technologies are, of course, designed to 
facilitate the capture and storage of police-relevant information but ultimately that 
configuration will come to shape the nature of the information captured and formally 
processed. Although this system was quite capable of storing wide ranging 
information, there was a sense amongst officers that the system was geared towards 
capturing information about those already known to the police:   
 
But the problem is there’s certain intelligence, cos if you, if that officer put 
that information on a five-by-five it’s feeding into the intelligence system, 
then if there wasn’t a nominal, if they weren’t already criminally, or known to 
the police for some reason and on our systems there’d be nowhere for the 
intelligence system to hang it on. (PC/04) 
 
There is also a relationship between officer’s assessments of the credibility of sources 
of information and the configuration of National Intelligence Model processes. As we 
have seen, sources of information are formally assessed, using national guidelines, 
and rated before they are submitted for processing. Information generated from 
residents – who are generally unknown to officers – accordingly receive an 
‘unreliable’ or ‘untrusted’ rating and the result, according to participants in this study, 
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is that the information will not be acted on unless verified by other sources of 
information.  
 
The nature of (community) intelligence  
The above discussion has implications for the character of information generated from 
neighbourhood policing, which is considered in the following sections. As has been 
stressed, the nature of intelligence is inevitably shaped by the mechanisms through 
which it is generated. As set out in the introduction, the processes through which 
neighbourhood policing is presumed to generate information are broadly threefold: 
through the observations and actions of neighbourhood officers embedded in 
neighbourhoods; through the observations of residents relayed to officers in 
conditions of greater understanding and trust; and through the more formal public 
meetings and consultation events organised by neighbourhood officers.  
 
Accounts demonstrated that the bulk of the information submitted to the intelligence 
system generated through neighbourhood policing is the result of neighbourhood 
officer’s own observations of and actions within communities. A minority is 
generated from direct police interaction with residents. That information which does 
originate from direct police and community interaction is, according to officers, 
usually derived from the formal police-community engagement mechanisms rather 
than, for example, informal encounters during routine patrol. This no doubt reflects, at 
least in part, the above discussion of how knowledge and structure interact to render 
information generated from residents less reliable than that generated from other 
sources. However, it is contended that it also reflects some inherent difficulties within 
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the mechanisms through which neighbourhood policing is presumed to generate 
information, to which I now turn. 
 
Limits to the ‘all knowing, all wise’ officer  
Reflecting Manning and Hawkins (1989) and Cope (2004) I have suggested that for 
police officers themselves valid knowledge about the police environment is 
contextual, grounded in social life as experienced by officers on the streets and needs 
to be learnt over time. However, as Manning and Hawkins (1989) go on to argue, this 
view is actually somewhat incongruous as this knowledge is not in the gift of many 
officers. Indeed, developing officer knowledge about communities through facilitating 
the development of relationships between police officers and residents over time has 
been an aim of community policing. In particularly, community policing discourse 
has drawn wistfully ‘on a golden age of police-community relations, often epitomised 
as the village bobby, all knowing, all wise and perfectly in tune with the temper of his 
local community’ (Weatheritt, 1986: 88). However, if the representation of the ‘all 
knowing, all wise’ bobby was ever an authentic one, officers drew attention to how 
certain organisational and administrative features of neighbourhood policing function 
to limit what officers can possibly know about their communities, points which are 
elaborated in the following sections. 
 
Contrary to the stereotypical image of the community officer, neighbourhood officers 
do not spend their whole careers coming to organically understand the community 
within which they work. In fact, many officers move on to different roles within the 
police service relatively quickly
iv
. Officer accounts drew attention to two primary 
issues which come to determine how long officers remain in one neighbourhood. 
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First, officers discussed the nature of the promotion process. On the one hand, 
interviewees drew attention to how those officers who wish to progress through the 
rank structure need to gain experience in a range of different operational roles. On the 
other hand, officers suggested that – perhaps reflecting the resources committed to 
neighbourhood policing in recent years, coupled with a strong organisational drive to 
implement this form of policing – neighbourhood policing roles have themselves been 
seen by officers as way of securing promotion in recent years. Either way, the result is 
relatively rapid movement around the organisation. Second, participants drew 
attention to how the length of time spent in the neighbourhood role is influenced by 
officer’s perceptions of what the police role should be. Whilst many neighbourhood 
policing officers interviewed noted that they enjoyed their role – ‘it’s the best job in 
the world’ (PC/03) –  they drew attention to how more broadly officers preferred the 
‘exciting’ ‘blue light’ policing roles (such as rapid response and reactive 
investigations) which are more in tune with the reasons why they joined the police 
service in the first place. In short, community policing roles contrast with the image of 
officers as ‘crime fighters’. Indeed, officers participating in this study drew attention 
to how neighbourhood policing is invariably represented as ‘drinking tea with the 
elderly’ (PCSO/4) and the role is viewed by some officers as ‘soft’ (PC/01), ‘pink and 
fluffy’ (PC/02) and a ‘doddle’ (PCSO/4). Whilst certainly ‘we should not equate 
community policing with a ‘social service’ and fast response, dispatched patrol with 
‘crime control’ (Fielding, 2009: 6) there clearly remains a sense that officers 
themselves make this distinction and prioritise fast response crime control in terms of 
their careers.   
 
Resources  
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Resource constraints further influence the extent to which officers understand 
communities. In short, whilst investment in neighbourhood policing since the turn of 
the century has certainly been considerable, resources are clearly finite. Two 
interrelated themes dominated officers’ accounts of this issue. Firstly, the 
geographical size of neighbourhoods. As noted, the unit around which neighbourhood 
policing is organised is usually a ward, which is certainly a relatively small subsection 
of a police service. However, officers noted that the geographical size of some 
neighbourhoods limits how much of that could realistically be patrolled on foot: ‘I am 
walking, but you know, there's only one of me and I need to be clever with where I'm 
at. If you haven't got an issue then you probably won't see me walking up your street’ 
(PC/05). A further consequence is that despite guidance, which has stated that officers 
should spend significant amounts of time patrolling on foot, many officers reportedly 
still resort to their cars to move around their neighbourhoods. This removes officers 
from their immediate environment and limits the extent to which they are potentially 
visible and available to residents. Secondly, officers drew attention to population 
density. The number of neighbourhood officers available coupled with large and 
diverse communities influences the extent to which officers can realistically organise 
(or otherwise attend) community engagement events in the name of getting to know 
residents.  
 
Assessing the value of information  
Reflecting Innes et al (2005), officers participating in this study drew attention to how 
a consequence of inexperience and limited training is that some officers find it 
difficult to assess the value of information before they submit it. Officers noted that 
this can result both in too little and too much information being submitted for 
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processing. A significant problem, noted by many commentators, is ‘information 
overload’ which results where the amount of information generated outweighs the 
number of staff to deal with it (Sheptycki, 2004). Whilst officers participating in this 
study gave examples where seemingly innocuous bits of information became 
important in building cases they were also very aware that submitting too much 
information leads to delays in processing it. This is potentially problematic since 
officers, oriented towards information which facilitates law enforcement outcomes, 
tend to value timely information, as discussed earlier in this article. As such in certain 
circumstances delays in processing information may lead to analytical products based 
on it being viewed by officers as less useful. Officers also reported that it causes 
wider difficulties for the management of the system. When the system becomes 
overloaded officers are encouraged to stop submitting information only to be 
encouraged to start again once the system has more capacity. Ultimately, slow data 
processing, along with this ‘stop-start’ approach, may minimise the incentive for 
police officers to submit information in the first place.  
 
The structure and organisation of neighbourhood policing  
Lastly, the structure of the community engagement mechanisms embedded in 
neighbourhood policing shape the nature of information generated. We have seen that 
public meetings form a mechanism through which information generated directly 
from residents may become incorporated into intelligence systems. Drawing this 
information to the National Intelligence Model process to provide ‘a basis for 
strategic and tactical decision making’ is certainly in the spirit of neighbourhood 
policing which, as set out in the introduction, seeks to incorporate neighbourhood 
priorities as ‘intelligence issues’ (ACPO/NCPE, 2006: 14). However, this is a narrow 
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form of information which reflects the experiences, perceptions and priorities of the 
residents who attend the meetings. Reflecting the findings of many other studies 
officers reported that attendance at these meetings is generally low and non-
representative of communities. Reflecting the above discussion, an additional issue 
for officers themselves is that these public meetings were viewed as unlikely to 
generate the types of information which they valued most which, as we have seen, 
tends to be information oriented towards the disruption of known criminals generated 
from sources close to these activities and people.  Indeed, drawing on the 
aforementioned notion of ‘drinking tea with the elderly’ officers were concerned that 
they may spend too much time in meetings with the ‘nicer villagers’ (PC/07) and not 
enough time building relationships with those people who have more direct access to 
the information about offenders and offending that they value – those engaged in 
offending themselves:   
 
How many safer neighbourhood teams would be, have been to see the local 
[prolific offender] for a cup of tea? And getting information from places that 
are slightly more challenging. So it's a lot comfier and easier to maybe go to 
the village hall and have a cup of tea than maybe visit the [prolific offender] or 
visit the chap that's been released from prison. So I think we're maybe not 
engaging enough with the right community groups. (PC/07) 
 
The construction of analytical products   
It is the role of analysts to construct pictures of crime problems to inform police 
decision making. The nature of the analytical products is strongly influenced by the 
organisational context in which they are being used. Reflecting official discourse 
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analysts and officers drew attention to how analytical products feed into the different 
levels of the National Intelligence Model from force (and region) to neighbourhood 
level. Similar data are used at all levels but the products they generate are different 
and, in turn, they are used in different ways. The following sections consider the 
construction of the analytic products, before returning to how they are used. 
 
Analytical products are constructs derived from sources strongly embedded in the 
social organisation and administration of the police service. Two primary data sources 
are reportedly used by analysts in this police service. Firstly, information derived 
from the intelligence system, the nature of which has been discussed in detail above. 
We have seen the processes which shape this information towards that which officers 
view as central to crime control. Information submitted to the system is also generated 
from Crimestoppers,
v
 proactively generated from surveillance teams or covert human 
sources (‘informants’) and ‘technical’ information (such as CCTV). Secondly, 
analysts draw on information derived from administrative data sets routinely collated 
by the police service such as recorded crime and calls for service data. These data 
themselves are strongly embedded in the police administration and practices of police 
officers and their limitations well documented and will not be repeated here (see 
Maguire, 2007).  
 
In principle, data sets collated by agencies other than the police could be used in 
developing analytic products. Whilst much has been made of the benefits of 
generating information from partner agencies, such as the health and social services, 
for the purposes of community and intelligence-led policing the analysts in this police 
service noted did not routinely use data-sets generated from non-police agencies at the 
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local level. Whilst data sharing problems have been explained in terms of cultural 
differences between agencies – often expressed as concerns about the confidentiality 
of certain data (Phillips et al 2002) – difficulties in data sharing here seemed to stem 
primarily from technical problems. Analysts drew attention to how different agencies 
generated information in different ways and in different format. The consequence may 
be that data are not directly comparable and may not be subject to the same checks 
and balances as police data are which makes them difficult to use, as this analyst 
notes: Cos they didn’t have the, you know, checks that we have with our data with 
crime. Cos they unfortunately, they have a lot .... big chunks missing, some 
inaccuracies and that kind of stuff. It’s not as easy to use. (Analyst) 
 
The nature of analytic products are inevitably shaped by the types of information from 
which they are generated and so it is not surprising that analytic products are 
generally used to understand crime – rather than other forms of police-relevant – 
problems. However, this statement should be qualified to some extent. This crime 
focus is most apparent at the force level where, reflecting the National Intelligence 
Model structure, focus is very much on understanding the activities of those viewed as 
the most prolific and dangerous criminals who may be committing offences over wide 
geographical areas. In contrast, analytical products generated for use at 
neighbourhood level may focus on lower level antisocial behaviour, disorder and 
environmental problems which are often drawn to the attention of neighbourhood 
officers by residents, as indicated in previous sections. 
 
Come what may, accounts demonstrated that products themselves become oriented 
towards understanding problems, people and places in particular kinds of ways. In 
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principle, analytic products could be constructed in different ways. They could, for 
example, be composed in terms of understanding the social determinants of 
victimisation (or offending for that matter). Or they could be constructed in terms of 
understanding the features of environments that facilitate the development of crime 
and other problems. However, participants – both officers and analysts – were very 
clear that the primary objective of developing the analytic products was to disrupt 
offending (or antisocial behaviour) through enforcing the criminal or civil law. One 
analyst noted ‘We’re not going to reduce crime or detect crime if we don’t catch 
people, it’s as simple as that.’ The central purpose of creating analytical products then 
is to provide officers with information to inform the deployment of resources to the 
‘right people’ and the ‘right places’ in order to ‘catch people red handed.’ So analysts 
create products which seek to illustrate the spatial and temporal organisation of crime 
and the habits and routines of offenders. The ultimate aim is for these to orient the 
deployment of police resources towards those people and places:  
 
Yes, yeah, it’s about catching people red handed, that's what it is, that's what 
intelligence is all about.  It’s building up pictures about what’s happening and 
it’s apply the resources and then that can be overt and covert, it doesn’t matter 
– it’s employing the right resources at the right time in the right place to catch 
people. (Analyst)  
 
A final feature of the analytical products in this police service is that they do not 
provide detailed recommendations about the nature of the resources, interventions or 
tactics that might be employed to address problems. This is left to police officers to 
determine through the National Intelligence Model tasking and briefing process, to 
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which I return shortly. Analysts – at both force and borough level – did not believe 
that they had the operational experience and knowledge to make detailed 
recommendations
vi
. If they did suggest tactics they would do so in collaboration with 
officers. Again, this view seems to reflect the importance placed on experiential 
knowledge within the policing environment which comes to shape not only how 
analytical products are constructed but potentially how they are viewed by analysts 
and officers. There was certainly no evidence that analytical products intrinsically 
‘lack credibility’ with officers because they are not founded in experiential knowledge 
gained ‘working the streets’ (Cope, 2004: 200).  However, analysts and officers alike 
certainly believed it was not the remit of analysts to make detailed recommendations 
for police practice. There has been debate about whether analysts should, or should 
not, provide tactical recommendations for police officers (see Evans, 2009). The 
result is that planning is left to police officers, with implications for how (and indeed 
if) products are used to shape police decision making, discussion of which comprises 
the final sections of this article.  
 
The nature of the tasking process 
Accounts – of both officers and analysts – demonstrated that the role that analytical 
products play in shaping neighbourhood policing decision making is very variable. 
The role is framed, at least in part, by the organisational context in which products are 
being used as well the officer’s position and role in the organisation and his or her 
understanding of and attitudes towards analysis. In conceptualising the role played by 
analytical products in shaping officer decision making there is, at the very least, a 
distinction to be made between ‘policy’ level decision making about the broad 
allocation of resources – characterised by Manning and Hawkins (1989) as reflective, 
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centralised and general – and individual officer decision making on a day-to-day level 
– characterised by Manning and Hawkins (1989) as practical, immediate and non-
reflective.  
 
In this police service, ‘policy’ decisions about the nature of the people and problems 
on which to concentrate neighbourhood resources in the short to medium term are 
made at management meetings, held at regular intervals, and in the more immediate 
term at daily briefings for neighbourhood officers. Both are primary sites of 
neighbourhood policing decision making. According to the accounts of analysts their 
role within them has, in recent years, ‘been pushed more and more’ (analyst). 
According to analysts and police officers, analytic products certainly feed into both 
areas of decision making
vii
.  However, in determining what problems on which to 
concentrate neighbourhood policing resources there was acknowledgement that 
managers are influenced by a range of issues of which the products of analysis is only 
one. The factors which may influence decisions are variable and include the 
availability of resources, force priorities and targets along with external pressures 
from, for example, local politicians, the press or members of the public. As Ratcliffe 
(2003: 4) notes ‘even good intelligence has to compete to influence decision-makers’.  
 
Analytic products are one of a number of factors which determine which problem 
types to allocate resources but they may also play a role in determining how problems 
are tackled. As we have seen, the products tend to provide detailed information about 
the temporal and spatial distribution of crime and the routines of ‘nominals’. Analysts 
drew attention to how their products are used to help determine how, where and when 
neighbourhood policing resources are deployed. Most obviously officers are pointed 
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towards patrolling particular places at particular times of the day. Shift patterns may 
indeed be re-allocated to facilitate this. Officers may be briefed to arrest certain 
individuals, or otherwise visit their homes or to collate more information about 
problems. Come what may, the analytical products tended to be constructed in terms 
of the efficient allocation of neighbourhood policing personnel. This analyst explains 
how products may be used by police managers:  
 
This is the offending, these are the days, I’m going to get my team to change 
their shift pattern cos it’s all over night. And the neighbourhood inspector will 
say right, I’m going to change my team’s hours to go out overnight on 
Tuesdays and Thursdays cos that’s what the document’s telling me. And the 
intelligence says that it’s likely to be this guy using, you know wearing these 
clothes. So I’m going to circulate that photo to my team. That’s what the 
neighbourhood inspector will sort of say. And then all of his resources will be 
targeted from that. (Analyst) 
 
Whilst it should not be assumed that analytical products shape policy decisions in a 
straight forward way, participants in this study drew attention to how the role played 
by analysis in shaping individual level police officer practice is even more complex. 
Neighbourhood officers were asked to reflect on the role that data and analysis played 
in shaping their day-to-day routines and practices. Responses demonstrated that 
officers make varying use of analytic products. There was a spectrum of responses. 
Some officers reported that they made little or no use of analysis – over and above 
being directed towards certain people, places and problems by the aforementioned 
tasking process – and who claimed they had little or no knowledge of analysis and the 
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National Intelligence Model (other than submitting information): ‘We don’t have any 
sort of dealings with that kind of stuff, yeah. We just do our paperwork and then it 
goes through the process’ (PCSO/1). However, in contrast, other officers described 
how they incorporated data into their day-to-day activities, analysed data themselves 
and indeed proactively asked analysts for additional data with which to inform their 
decision making and work with communities.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This article has examined the structure and process of an intelligence system focusing 
on the relationship between neighbourhood policing and the National Intelligence 
Model. In so doing, factors which shape how (community) intelligence is constructed 
have been identified. These can be found in a relationship between officer 
conceptions of knowledge and the organisational and structural features of the police 
service. This serves to remind us that whilst crime analysis technologies appear to 
allow for the development of ‘objective’ or ‘scientific’ policing, the processes 
involved in their manufacture are subjective and interpretative (Innes et al 2005: 54). 
However, I conclude this article by considering how the call for neighbourhood 
policing and the National Intelligence Model to interact has implications for how the 
two approaches should be understood.  
 
As documented in the introduction of this article, community and intelligence-led 
policing styles may well be viewed as somewhat conceptually distinct. Whilst 
community policing has been concerned with (re)legitimising the police/community 
relationship intelligence-led policing has been concerned less with comprehensive 
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reform of the police vision and more concerned with the efficient allocation of police 
resources. However, contemporary policing discourse in the UK has called for the two 
approaches to interact and this article has examined how aspects of neighbourhood 
policing are operationalized via the National Intelligence Model. By institutionalising 
aspects of neighbourhood policing through National Intelligence Model processes, it 
is contended that the former has become embedded in the notions of efficiency and in 
conventional notions of law enforcement and crime control that have more commonly 
been associated with the latter. The relationship between neighbourhood policing, the 
National Intelligence Model and crime control is borne out in a number of ways, 
which are summarised in these concluding sections.  
 
Neighbourhood policing serves to generate information rooted in notions of crime 
control. The social and structural organisation of policing moulds the generation of 
information in particular kinds of ways. For officers themselves legitimate forms of 
knowledge coalesce around experiential understanding of their social world grounded 
in and generated from what officers observe on the streets. The information submitted 
to intelligence systems is further filtered by a crime-centric and law enforcement 
standpoint. This interacts with organisational characteristics and the structural 
configuration of National Intelligence Model processes to orient the information 
submitted towards ‘real time’ information about crimes and ‘nominals’ generated 
from the actions and observations of officers themselves and those who have close 
association with the criminal world.  
 
In unpicking the nature of community intelligence some significant contradictions in 
the discourse of neighbourhood policing are revealed. Firstly, we need to question the 
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assertion that neighbourhood policing can generate the information about 
communities which it purports. The notion of the ‘all wise, all knowing’ officer is 
quite clearly a misleading one. A range of organisational, administrative and resource 
constraints limit what officers can possibly know about their communities. Secondly, 
much has made of generating information from residents in order to interpret the 
policing environment and to help frame police priorities in terms of what is important 
to and relevant for them. The assessments that officers make about information come 
to render information generated from residents as less valuable than information 
generated from other sources. In turn, information generated from residents is less 
likely to be submitted, processed and ultimately used to shape police practice.  
 
A relationship between neighbourhood policing and crime control is further founded 
in the nature of the analytic products generated. Analytical products should quite 
clearly be understood ‘as an artefact of the data and methods used in their 
construction, rather than providing an accurate representation of any crime problems’ 
(Innes et al, 2005: 39). The data used to construct analytic products are founded in a 
law enforcement perspective and in the administrative processes of the police service. 
Products tend to be focused on crime rather than any other form of police-relevant 
information. The extent to which this is so is in fact shaped by the level in the 
organisation at which they are being used. Reflecting the structure of the National 
Intelligence Model, at the force level (and beyond) analytic products are strongly 
framed in terms of understanding and disrupting the activities of the most serious 
offenders. This focus is tempered at the neighbourhood level where issues such as 
anti-social behaviour, which tend to be prioritised by residents, may well also be 
considered by analysts. In this sense, through operationalising neighbourhood 
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policing through the National Intelligence Model the traditional focus of intelligence-
led policing on serious and prolific offenders, noted in the introduction, may have 
been diluted somewhat. Even so the crime control qualities of these products can be 
illustrated in other ways. The primary objective of developing analytic products is 
conceived in terms of disrupting offending through arresting offenders and enforcing 
the criminal law. As such the products become constructed in terms of the temporal 
and spatial organisation of crime problems along with information about the routines 
of offenders and detailed tactical decision making is generally left to police officers. 
 
The relationship between neighbourhood policing and crime control is a result of the 
character of the tasking process. In principle, the National Intelligence Model tasking 
structure should drive neighbourhood policing deployment and resources. There is 
quite clearly complexity here and the role played by analytical products in shaping 
police practice may be framed, at least in part, by the position, role and function of 
officers within the organisation. It should certainly not be assumed that officers will 
draw on the products of the intelligence system to shape their practice. Nevertheless, 
where used at all police managers use analytical products to more efficiently direct 
neighbourhood policing resources to where it is assumed they will have most impact 
in terms of crime control. This is comes to be understood in terms of conventional 
policing tactics such as high visibility patrol, disruption, arrest and enforcement of the 
criminal law.  
 
Community policing was born from a reaction against conventional reactive policing 
– focused on control of crime through response, deterrence and apprehension, law 
enforcement and crisis response – and in contrast stresses community order, peace 
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and security, crime control as a means (rather than an end) and preventative as well as 
reactive policing (Fielding, 1995a). However, I suggest contemporary manifestations 
of community policing in the UK are, in fact, embedded in and reinforcing those very 
conventional notions of crime control.  
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i
 These meetings have difference names. Casey (2008) showed that at least 15 different names were in 
use from Panel Meetings to Neighbourhood Action Panels to Community Action Meetings to PACT 
(Police and Communities Together) meetings. The aims and structure of the meetings are nevertheless 
similar. 
ii
 It is also based on informal discussions with senior police officers and observations of the intelligence 
systems in practice.  
iii
 Attempts are made to protect the source of the information.  
iv
 Guidance suggested that neighbourhood officers should spend in the order of three years at least in 
one neighbourhood.  
v
 A charity sponsored telephone line through which members of the public can leave anonymous 
information. 
vi
 Although reflecting (Cope, 2004) analysts often pointed to the benefits of being ‘nosey’ and having 
and ‘investigative mind’  
vii
 And observation of the tasking process clearly demonstrated the presence of analytical products  
